Rail investment and port competition: a case study for the Betuweroute by Koetse, Mark J. & Rouwendal, Jan
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 44 (2010): 57-75 
 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rail investment and port competition: 
a case study for the Betuweroute 
 
Mark J. Koetse 1∗, Jan Rouwendal 1, 2 
 
1
 VU University, Department of Spatial Economics, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
2
 Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents a study on the impact of investment in the Betuweroute and alternative transport 
pricing schemes on port competition between Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp. The Betuweroute is a 
160 kilometre dedicated freight railway line connecting the port of Rotterdam with the German Ruhr area. 
If the line could, in the near or more remote future, attract a large share of transit freight, it will be of 
considerable importance for the competitive position of the port of Rotterdam relative to Hamburg and 
Antwerp. We use a transport network model that includes the three ports and allows for transport by road, 
rail and inland waterways to and from the Ruhr area. We run model simulations for scenario’s with and 
without the Betuweroute and with and without marginal social cost pricing. The results show that, 
although the Betuweroute is a welfare reducing investment, it may indeed be of crucial importance to the 
port of Rotterdam. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past, ports were fairly insulated from competitive forces, each port serving its 
own, more or less captive hinterland (Haralambides, 2002). Trade barriers, national 
borders and inadequate hinterland infrastructure were mainly responsible for this 
situation. Nowadays, European ports are facing major external challenges, including the 
grouping of container shipping lines into powerful consortia, resulting in downward 
pressure on prices, increased efficiency levels in maritime transport and the importance 
of logistical chains (Farrell, 1999). These developments, in combination with trade 
liberalisation associated with the emergence of a single internal EU market and 
technological changes, have had a considerable impact on trade flows and hence on the 
port industry. The result is a competitive market situation in which hinterlands are no 
longer captives of the port with which they have the best connection. The mobility of 
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the transhipment container, together with intertwined land transport networks have 
simultaneously extended the hinterlands of all ports and intensified competition among 
these ports (Haralambides, 2002). Today, it makes little difference if a container from 
Asia destined for Duisburg will pass through the port of Hamburg, Rotterdam or 
Antwerp. 
Competition concentrates on the extensive port-based logistic chains that developed 
in close relationship with the containerisation (Meersman et al., 2002). It is important 
for ports to belong to a successful logistic chain of a particular freight flow and for this 
purpose efficiency and other characteristics of the ports themselves are important, but 
also the connections with the hinterland. An adequate transport infrastructure, which 
should not be limited to a single mode, is an important element in any attempt to retain 
or increase market share. 
The Betuweroute is such a potentially important transport axis. It is a 160 kilometre 
dedicated freight railway line connecting the port of Rotterdam with the German 
hinterland. This project is interesting since political decision making and calculations on 
its profitability were based on questionable assumptions (see Section 2). The 
construction of the Betuweroute was motivated by two main reasons (TCI, 2004 and 
Algemene Rekenkamer, 2000). The first reason for construction was to consolidate the 
(economic) position of the port of Rotterdam as one of Europe’s key transport and 
distribution hubs (employment) and to facilitate the expected growth in freight traffic in 
the Netherlands. The second reason was environmental in nature; rail is considered as a 
relatively environmental friendly mode of transport and the Betuweroute was expected 
to be a realistic substitute for road transport. In this paper we use a transport network 
model to assess whether construction of the Betuweroute indeed contributes to these 
two goals. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some ex-ante 
assessments of the Betuweroute. In Section 3 we present the transport model and 
transport network used for our analyses, while Section 4 discusses the modelling 
scenarios and the inputs of the model. In Section 5 we present the simulation results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Ex-ante assessments of the Betuweroute 
 
The Betuweroute project comprises an upgrade of the existing Rotterdam Port 
Railway, which runs from the Europoort at Maasvlakte via the Waalhaven container rail 
service centre to the Kijfhoek shunting yard, and constructing of a new double-track line 
that parallels the A15 motorway to the German border near Emmerich. It links the port 
of Rotterdam to the existing German rail network at the Dutch/German border. The 
government decision to build the Betuweroute was taken in 1994 and was ratified by a 
committee and parliament in 1995. Work to upgrade the port railway started in 1997. 
Construction of embankments, tunnels and bridges for the A15 line began in 1998. The 
Betuweroute is the first double-track railway line in the Netherlands dedicated to freight 
transport. It was completed in July 2007. Total costs amount about 4.7 billion Euro 
according to recent estimates. The 25-tonne axle load Betuweroute will have a capacity 
of 10 trains per hour in each direction. Top speed will be 120 km/h and trains are 
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expected to take between one-and-a-half and two hours to travel the 160 kilometres 
from Rotterdam to the German border. 
The completion of the Betuweroute ends a period of about 25 years of planning, 
research, construction and last, but certainly not least, discussion. The railway line has 
been very controversial for many reasons. The analyses of social costs and benefits of 
the route to be discussed in the present section played a major role in the decision 
making process. A first assessment of the Betuweroute is by Knight Wendling and it 
was concluded that (Knight Wendling, 1991, p. 26): “the necessity of construction is 
endorsed by economic and social issues like environmental concern, infrastructure 
capacity and economic cost/benefit ratio. Also from an international perspective the 
Betuwe freight railway route is an indispensable link to execute EU-policy and to react 
appropriately to the changing position of road traffic.” In the next year this conclusion 
was documented by a ‘macro-economic and social cost-benefit analysis of the Betuwe 
route’ (Knight Wendling, 1992) that stated that until 2010 tax revenues with a present 
value of 5.4 billion Euro would be forgone if the Betuwe route would not be 
constructed. Improvement of inland waterway transport could limit this loss to 3.45 
billion Euro. The costs of the Betuweroute were estimated to be around 2.36 billion 
Euro and it was expected that this investment would be paid back completely by 2000. 
The Knight Wendling conclusion is remarkable for a number of reasons. In the first 
place, Knight Wendling was asked by Dutch Railways (NS) to compare two 
alternatives: a reference case in which freight transport by rail would completely 
disappear, and one in which freight transport would grow to 65 million ton per year. 
The latter figure was based on a target set by NS, which is generally considered as 
ambitious. This implies that Knight Wendling did not itself assess the effect of 
construction of the Betuweroute on freight transport. In other words, the direct effect of 
the Betuwe route on the development of the volume of freight transport was taken as 
given (that is, incorporated in the self-imposed target set by NS) rather than estimated. 
Also, the reasoning in the Knight Wendling report is macro economic and stresses the 
indirect or secondary effects. Later on it became clear that a substantial part of the 
effects reported by Knight Wendling were ‘image’ effects for the Rotterdam port that 
are absent in conventional economic models. 
The large macro-economic benefits suggest that it is unnecessary to care much about 
the returns to the investment in terms of user fees. The capital invested in the Betuwe 
route would soon be paid back by (other) tax revenues, at least if the optimistic 
assumptions about the development of freight transport were accepted. A later analysis 
by the CPB (1993) concluded that even after subtraction of the ‘image’ effects the 
Betuwe route still appeared to be a worthwhile investment. The CPB report, however, 
also did not provide an independent assessment of the development of freight transport 
in general, let alone of the demand for transport over the Betuwe route. In fact, an 
independent assessment that investigated the demand for freight transport over the 
Betuweroute under particular conditions of price and quality was never conducted. 
The Knight Wendling analysis took for granted that that the voluminous flows of 
goods to be transported by rail in the ambitious NS scenario made it necessary that a 
new route should be constructed. However, from a CPB (1995) study it is clear that 
upgrading the Rotterdam Port Railway and doubling the existing railway between 
Rotterdam and Utrecht served to postpone any capacity problems for freight transport to 
(at least) 2009. Recent figures by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) indicate that about 29 
mln tonnes of freight were transported by rail in 2005 in the Netherlands (see 
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http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?la=en) and there are no serious indications of capacity 
problems even though the Rotterdam-Utrecht railroad has not been doubled and the 
Betuwe route was not yet available.1 Moreover, there appears to be no interest at all in 
freight transport over the Betuwe route immediately after its completion in July 2007. 
We conclude therefore that even this seemingly trivial step in the argument was less 
innocent than it seems to be at first sight. 
Also the assumptions on the environmental superiority of rail transport can be 
questioned. A study by the RIVM compared the environmental effects of transporting 
an equal amount of freight by road and rail, and found relatively modest differences (see 
Van Wee et al., 1994). Moreover, early environmental assessments ignore new 
developments in truck technology that mitigate the environmental damage caused by 
trucks. It was also pointed out that the Betuweroute was expected to generate a 
substantial amount of additional freight, which would increase pollution, etc. The 
conclusion emerged that the environmental effects of the Betuweroute could safely be 
ignored. 
In view of these conclusions the most surprising aspect of the Betuweroute appears to 
be that so many people were convinced that neglecting this opportunity for investment 
in rail infrastructure would cause significant damage to the Dutch economy. A tentative 
explanation for this conviction could be the following. At the end of the 1980s there 
was considerable anxiousness among Rotterdam entrepreneurs about the future of road 
transport: congestion problems and environmental policies were regarded as major 
threats to the fast and cheap transport towards the German hinterland. In particular, 
there was concern about the better rail connection of Hamburg and the emerging plans 
to improve the railway connection between the port of Antwerp and Germany by 
upgrading the so-called ‘Iron Rhine’. Clearly, the construction of a modern railway 
dedicated to freight transport and providing a direct connection between Rotterdam and 
Germany would imply a major competitive advantage in case rail transport would 
indeed become an important substitute for the use of trucks. These strategic 
considerations were combined with ambitions of Dutch railways who regarded the 
Betuweroute as the last opportunity to save its cargo division and the willingness of 
Dutch politicians to invest substantially in (apparently) environment-friendly transport 
modes instead of in roads. The result was a very costly project, the benefits of which are 
still unclear.2 
 
 
3. The transport model and transport network 
 
The model used for our analysis is the MOLINO II model developed at the K.U. 
Leuven. The model structure allows for an economic assessment of improvements in a 
transport network with various nodes, links and paths. A full description of the model is 
outside the scope of this paper, and we restrict our discussion in this section to 
highlighting the features that are crucial for understanding and interpreting the results 
presented in the following sections.3 
                                                 
1
 In the Knight-Wendling scenario total freight transport by rail would be equal to 30 million ton by 2000. 
2
 See TCI (2004) for an extensive description of the political decision making process leading towards the 
construction of the Betuweroute. 
3
 See De Palma et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the MOLINO II model. 
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Figure 1: The transport network analysed in our case study (IWW is inland waterways). 
 
As is clear from the previous sections we focus on the impact of the Betuweroute on 
the competition between Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg for international freight 
transport. We concentrate attention on freight that arrives from over the North Sea and 
moves to the hinterland beyond the German border, in which the Ruhr area still 
occupies a central position. This international freight may use the ports of Rotterdam, 
Hamburg or Antwerp and from there use (existing) rail, road or inland waterways. The 
Betuweroute is meant as a substantial improvement in the available rail infrastructure 
and for this reason we model it as a separate mode/link. A special characteristic of the 
Betuweroute is, of course, that it is only available until the German border, which is 
therefore included as a separate ‘node’ in the part of the network that connects 
Rotterdam with its hinterland. Figure 1 presents the transport network used for our 
analyses. 
The actors in the MOLINO II model are users of this transport network. They are 
assumed to have a common structure of their utility or production functions, which can 
be described by a decision tree. One of the actors are producers that have a demand for 
international freight transport. Their production function has – at the highest level – two 
arguments: other inputs and international transport. The latter should be interpreted as a 
composite commodity, whose value is determined by the various transport types. The 
idea is that any level of production can be realised with various combinations of 
transport and other inputs and that the actual amount of transport used will depend on its 
relative price. The composite commodity ‘transport’ is determined by peak and off-peak 
transport by means of a lower-level production function. At a still lower level, the 
amounts of peak and off-peak transport are determined by the links of the network used. 
For international freight transport these links are determined by the port used 
(Rotterdam, Antwerp or Hamburg) and the transport mode (road, rail or inland 
waterways). We treat the Betuweroute as a separate mode, which is only relevant for 
transport that passes through the port of Rotterdam. 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 44 (2010): 57-75 
 62 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of the production function with two links. 
 
The production function can be described by the nested decision tree in Figure 2. A 
producer who wants to make a certain number of units of the final product first decides 
how many units of transport and other inputs to use. In the next step, he decides how 
this total amount of transport is determined by peak and off-peak transport. Then he 
decides if the required amounts of peak and off-peak transport are to be transported by 
road, rail or inland waterways and from Rotterdam, Antwerp or Hamburg. For 
simplicity we have assumed in that figure that only two links have to be distinguished, 
whereas in reality there are 9 or 10 (depending on the inclusion of the Betuweroute in 
the set of links). For each level of the production structure a CES-function is assumed to 
be relevant. Such a function is characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution. For 
two inputs, the CES function looks as: 
 
( )11 2x a y b y σσ σ= + , (1) 
 
where x denotes the amount of output, yi the amount of input i, a and b are scale 
coefficients, and σ  is the crucial parameter of this function because it determines the 
elasticity of substitution between the two inputs as well as the price elasticities of their 
demand. 
There are two other actors that make use of the network. There are producers with a 
demand for domestic freight transport, which results in transport flows that originate 
from one of the three ports and that have the German hinterland as their destination. 
These producers are located in the German Hinterland and their production structure is 
almost the same as that of producers with a demand for international freight 
transporters. The only difference is that the number of links is restricted to 3 or 4 (in 
case of Rotterdam with the Betuweroute as one link). Part of the network is also used 
for passenger transport. The generation of this type of transport is modeled by means of 
a utility function that is also of a nested CES type. The nesting structure is analogous to 
that for the producers, taking into account that inland waterways are not used for 
passenger transport. We abstract from international passenger transport and introduce 
four actors generating transport. The origin-destination combinations of these four 
actors are: Hamburg – German hinterland, Antwerp – German hinterland, Rotterdam – 
German border, and German border – German hinterland. 
The three actors in the model interact with each other if they use the same network 
link. This interaction is modeled through a travel time function, which gives the travel 
Production 
Transport Other inputs 
Link 2 Link 1 
Off-Peak 
Link 2 Link 1 
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time on a particular network link as a function of the total flow of transport of the 
network. Travel time (tt) on a certain link is given by the following speed-flow relation: 
 
1
j j
j
pce q
l
tt
v c
β 
 × 
  = + α      
 
∑
, (2) 
 
where l is length of the link, v is maximum free-flow speed, pcej is passenger car 
equivalent for vehicle type j, qj is the number of vehicles of type j per hour, c is free-
flow capacity, and α and β are (exogenous) congestion function parameters. In this 
equation the total transport flow is defined as the weighted sum of the number of 
vehicles, with pcej values used as weights. For instance, for road transport a truck is 
typically counted as equivalent to three passenger cars, implying that pcej = 3 for j equal 
to trucks. 
The travel time function in equation (2) was originally developed for road transport 
and is sometimes referred to as the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) travel time function. 
In our model it is also used for rail transport and inland waterway transport. Travel time 
cost is equal to travel time as given by equation (2), multiplied by the value of time. The 
generalised prices used at each level are the sum of unit resource costs, costs of travel 
time, i.e., including internal time costs of congestion, and tolls (if present). 
The calibration of the model starts by choosing reasonable values for the elasticities 
of substitution σ  for all levels of the production or utility functions of all actors. For the 
given values of generalized travel costs, optimizing behavior then generates the 
transport flows as functions of these elasticities of substitution and the scale parameters 
of the utility and production functions, which have been denoted as a and b in equation 
(1). These parameters are determined exactly by the values of the transport flows in the 
initial situation. We run the model from 2000 to 2025. The transport related output of 
the model consists of transport flows on the various links in 2025. The output also 
contains yearly figures on net user surplus (equal to passenger transport user surplus 
minus freight transport user costs), profits of the infrastructure operators and external 
costs. These ultimately result in total welfare, implying we can compare welfare 
situations between scenarios. 
 
 
4. Modelling scenarios and model inputs 
 
Our network analysis focuses on the implications of the Betuweroute on port 
competition. Using the network in Figure 1, but without the Betuweroute, as our 
baseline network, and current pricing as our baseline pricing scheme, our modelling 
analysis first considers the implications of the new Betuweroute infrastructure. Second, 
it investigates the impact of an alternative pricing scheme, i.e., marginal social cost 
pricing plus a mark-up for costs of infrastructure maintenance and operation. This 
results in 4 four different scenarios that are summarised below: 
 
- Scenario 1 (baseline scenario): Current pricing, without Betuweroute; 
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- Scenario 2: Marginal social cost pricing plus mark-up for costs of infrastructure 
maintenance and operation, without Betuweroute; 
- Scenario 3: Current pricing, with Betuweroute; 
- Scenario 4: Marginal social cost pricing plus mark-up for costs of infrastructure 
maintenance and operation, with Betuweroute; 
 
Under marginal social cost pricing the external costs of congestion, greenhouse gas 
emissions, local pollution, noise and accidents, and costs of infrastructure maintenance 
are incorporated in the generalised prices. 
Important to note is that in our model the central government is the owner, manager 
and operator of all links, except the Betuweroute. The Betuweroute is operated and 
managed by a single separate entity. Therefore, except for the Betuweroute, all issues 
related to differences between private and public ownership, and between differences in 
organisational structures, are left out of the equation. 
Regarding inputs of the model, passenger and freight flows for specific routes are 
generally not available. This means that many assumptions are necessary. Ultimately, 
local and specific route knowledge is needed in order to calibrate the existing flows on 
the network links. In order to get some idea on the distribution of freight and passenger 
transport demand over the different links we use the ETIS database, which contains 
freight and passenger transport flows for origin-destination combinations at the NUTS 2 
level. Specifically, we derive the freight and passenger flows from Rotterdam, Antwerp 
and Hamburg to the Ruhr area, and vice versa. Of course, total transport flows are larger 
than the resulting flows, but this at least give us an idea of the distribution of 
international flows over the three links (for details see Koetse and Rouwendal, 2008). 
To get an idea on absolute figures we use data on realised rail freight flows on the 
East-West axis from Statistics Netherlands (see http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?la=en). 
This figure turns out to be a factor 24 higher than the figure drawn from the ETIS 
database. We therefore multiply all freight flows by rail by 24. Total domestic freight 
by rail in the Netherlands over the East-West axis is 0.28 times international freight. 
Domestic freight in The Netherlands is upgraded accordingly. Total international road 
freight transport from Germany to Netherlands and the other way around is 68 mln 
tonnes. This is approximately a factor 17 higher than flows obtained from the ETIS 
database. We adjust the figures accordingly. Since data for Germany and Belgium are 
not available, we apply the same scaling factor to road freight transport from Antwerp 
and Hamburg. Total water freight transport for freight loaded in Rotterdam with 
destination Germany, Austria or Switzerland, and the other way around, is around 90 
mln tonnes. This is a factor 2.3 higher than in the ETIS database, which is used as a 
scaling factor for water transport. We make the simplifying assumption that purely 
domestic transport is zero, i.e., every tonne transported over Dutch waters is transported 
to Germany. Since data for Germany and Belgium are not available, we apply the same 
scaling factor to inland navigation transport from Antwerp and Hamburg. The different 
scaling factors for the different modes imply that the ratios between modes obtained 
from the ETIS database are lost. However, the ratios within modes, and between routes, 
remain intact. Absolute figures on passenger transport on specific routes are hard to 
come by. This is why we use the same scaling factors for passenger transport. Although 
this potentially erroneous assumption has no direct impact, it may influence the results 
through the congestion functions. Finally, in order to make a distinction between 
transport flows during peak hours and off-peak hours, we assume that 70% of freight 
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transport and 80% of passenger transport takes place during peak hours, for all modes. 
The resulting passenger and freight transport flows on the links in our network are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Initial quantities in tonnes on the various paths in the network in 2000 (Betuweroute is excluded 
because initial flows are unknown). 
  
  Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
  Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak 
Road 95,000 41,000 124,000 53,000 - - 
IWW - - - - - - Rotterdam-German Border 
Rail 28,000 12,000 2,000 500 - - 
Road 48,000 20,000 124,000 53,000 17,000 4,000 
IWW - - 50,000 13,000 144,000 36,000 Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Rail 14,000 6,000 7,000 1,800 28,000 7,000 
Road 16,000 6,800 257,000 64,000 49,000 12,000 
IWW - - 51,000 13,000 11,000 2,800 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 2,000 800 35,000 8,500 3,500 1,000 
Road 82,000 35,000 55,000 14,000 37,000 9,500 
IWW - - 1,700 500 500 200 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 64,000 27,000 94,000 23,000 52,000 13,000 
 
With respect to the Betuweroute there are no appraisals that contain explicit freight 
flow predictions, so an assumption is necessary here. Assuming a capacity of 680 
tonnes per train (see Table 3) and an estimated number of trains per year of 20,000 
(personal communication with Keyrail, operator of the Betuweroute), we arrive at a 
freight flow on the Betuweroute of approximately 14 million tonnes in 2008. We set 
initial quantities on the Betuweroute in 2000 such that in 2008, in the scenarios with the 
Betuweroute and given the parameter values stated below, a freight flow of 14 million 
tonnes on the Betuweroute is obtained. The maximum speed on the Betuweroute is set 
at 1km/h per hour in 2000, effectively keeping the flows on the Betuweroute at zero. In 
the scenarios with the Betuweroute we increase the maximum speed to 100 km/h in 
2008.4 Other assumptions on the Betuweroute are that tolls are 0.33 Euro per tonne per 
trip, capacity is 20 trains per hour (10 in each direction), operation and maintenance 
costs are 20% lower than those of existing rail infrastructure.5 Finally, investment in the 
Betuweroute is estimated at 4.7 billion Euro (EC, 2005). Finally, transport flows have 
increased substantially in the past, so we implement a generic yearly growth rate of 2% 
(percentage change is measured over the yearly transport flow output of the model, not 
                                                 
4
 In order to calibrate the model using identical data in all scenarios we calibrate the model with a 
maximum speed on the Betuweroute of 1 km/h. In the scenario’s with the Betuweroute we increase the 
speed to 100 km/h in 2008. We set quantities on the Betuweroute in 2000 such that in 2008, for the 
scenarios with the Betuweroute, a transport flow of 14 million tonnes is obtained. This flow is substituted 
to the Betuweroute from other links. For the scenarios without the Betuweroute maximum speed simply 
remains at 1 km/h from year 1 to 25, which effectively keeps transport flows over the Betuweroute equal 
to zero. 
5
 Keyrail expects that costs of maintenance and operation can be reduced by 20% (at a minimum) vis-à-
vis costs of current practice in rail maintenance and operation (see www.keyrail.nl). 
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over the initial figures). Within the context of the model this implies that congestion 
becomes more and more important over the years. 
Values of general, not link specific parameters are listed in Table 2. Some remarks are 
in order here. Parameters α and β are the congestion function parameters in equation (2), 
where α determines the impact of an increase in traffic flows on travel time, and β 
determines the curvature of this relationship. The latter parameter is set equal to 1.5, 
which implies that the relationship is slightly non-linear. The parameter α  is set equal 
to 0.2. This implies that for a trip of an hour under free-flow conditions and a q/c ratio 
of 2, i.e., the number of vehicles is twice as large as the capacity, there is a delay of 
around 9 minutes. This appears to be reasonably in line with actual experience. Further, 
the passenger car equivalent (PCE) of a truck is set at 3 according to European 
standards, i.e., a truck is assumed to take up 3 times as much space as a car on the road. 
In the marginal social cost pricing scenario’s it therefore gets assigned a larger part of 
the external costs of congestion. Transport share is set at 0.05, which means that 5% of 
all consumption is spent on transport. 
Table 2: General (not link-specific) parameters. 
Parameter Value 
α  0.2 
β  1.5 
PCE truck 3 
Transport Share 0.05 
Elasticity periods passenger 0.2 
Elasticity periods freight 0.2 
Elasticity transport passenger 0.8 
Elasticity transport freight 0.8 
Elasticity paths passenger 1.5 
Elasticity paths freight 1.5 
Life Time infrastructure 35 years 
Interest 4% 
 
Important for the results of the model are the various substitution elasticities. 
Substitution elasticities between periods and between transport and other consumption 
are set equal to 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. The main consequence of this assumption is 
that time loss due to congestion leads to relatively small shifts from peak to off-peak 
transport flows, which of course also depends on the amount of congestion and the 
share of congestion costs in total resource costs. Substitution between paths for freight 
transport is assumed to be elastic; the elasticity is set at 3. Finally, the life time of the 
Betuweroute is set at 35 years and the discount rate is equal to 4%. 
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Table 3: Link-specific inputs (units of measurement are given below the table). 
Variable  Rotterdam – German 
Border 
German Border – 
Ruhr Antwerp – Ruhr Hamburg – Ruhr 
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Duration 
 8 12 8 12 8 12 8 8 12 8 8 12 8 
Length 
 160 160 160 160 95 95 95 225 225 225 355 355 355 
Capacity 
 8,800 20 12 20 8,800 20 12 8,800 20 12 8,800 20 12 
Maximum 
Speed 
 68 60 8 100 68 60 8 68 60 8 68 60 8 
Occupancy Passenger 
peak 1.2 500 - - 1.2 500 - 1.2 500 - 1.2 500 - 
 Passenger 
off-peak 1 200 - - 1 200 - 1 200 - 1 200 - 
 Freight 
peak 15 680 1,900 680 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 
 Freight 
off-peak 15 680 1,900 680 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 15 680 1,900 
Resource 
costs 
Passenger 0.54 12 - 12 0.89 12 - 0.89 12 - 0.89 12 - 
 Freight 0.89 12 45.00 12 0.89 12 45.00 0.89 12 45.00 0.89 12 45 
Variable MC Passenger 0.51 386 - - 0.3 230 - 0.71 543 - 1.12 857 - 
 Freight 19.3 706 84 706 11.5 419 50 27.1 992 119 42.8 1565 187 
Fixed OPC 
 7,600 57,000 41,000 45,600 4,500 34,000 24,000 10500 80000 57000 17,000 125,000 90,000 
VOT Passenger 
peak 6.7 6.7 - - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 
 Passenger 
off-peak 6.7 6.7 - - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 6.7 6.7 - 
 Freight 
peak 2.9 0.76 0.18 0.76 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 
 Freight 
off-peak 2.9 0.76 0.18 0.76 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 2.9 0.76 0.18 
External Costs Passenger 
peak 0.033 0.969 - - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 
 
Passenger 
off-peak 0.033 0.969 - - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 0.033 0.969 - 
 
Freight 
peak 0.175 1.381 1.204 1.381 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 
 
Freight 
off-peak 0.175 1.381 1.204 1.381 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 0.175 1.381 1.204 
Notes: 
Variable Unit of measurement 
Duration Number of peak hours per day 
Length Length of the links in kilometres 
Capacity Free-flow capacity per hour 
Maximum speed Kilometres per hour 
Occupancy Occupancy rates in passengers or tons per vehicle 
Resource costs Resource costs of vehicle use in Euro per vehicle kilometre 
Variable MC Variable infrastructure maintenance costs in Euro per passenger or freight vehicle  
Fixed OPC Fixed infrastructure operation costs in Euro per day 
Value of time Value of time in Euro per hour per passenger or tonne 
External costs Euro per vehicle kilometre (external costs of congestion, greenhouse gas emissions, 
local pollution, noise and accidents). 
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Values for link-specific parameters and variables are summarised in Table 3. Note 
that most figures differ per mode but not per country. For example, road data for The 
Netherlands are transferred to Belgium and Germany. The reason is that we could not 
obtain specific data for Belgium and Germany.6 When figures differ per country this is 
because of differences in length of the various links. For example, fixed operation costs 
are based on operation costs per km infrastructure in The Netherlands. Because the links 
differ in length, operation costs also differ by link. The same holds for variable 
maintenance costs. Values for maximum speeds and number of peak hours per day are 
based on assumptions, while length of the various links are based on own calculations. 
Occupancy rates for road passenger transport are based on (informed) assumptions, 
while occupancy rates for rail passenger transport is based on information contained in 
NS and Prorail (2006). Data on occupancy rates for freight transport, measured in 
tonnes per vehicle, are from a detailed freight transport database in The Netherlands 
(see NEA et al., 2005). Resource costs for the three modes, consisting of depreciation 
costs, interest costs, insurance costs, labour costs and other direct transport related costs, 
are obtained from the same source. 
Further, free-flow infrastructure capacities for IWW and rail transport are based on 
own assumptions, while road infrastructure capacity is based on an assumption of 2 
lanes per direction and 2,200 vehicles per lane per hour (see Smith et al., 1996). Values 
of time are important inputs for calculating costs of congestion. We use those that were 
used in the UNITE project (see Nellthorp et al., 2001). Finally, variable maintenance 
costs, fixed operation costs and external costs are derived from own calculations based 
on CE/VU (2004) and Statistics Netherlands (see http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/?la=en). 
Of course, the results presented in the following section depend to a certain extent to 
the values for the parameters and variables discussed above. Especially important are 
the uncertainty around initial passenger and freight transport flows, the absolute and 
relative magnitudes of the various costs figures, and the assumption on the substitution 
elasticity between paths. Sensitivity analyses should provide insight into the sensitivity 
of the results to changes in these values. 
 
 
5. Simulation results 
 
5.1. Welfare consequences 
 
In Table 4 we present the results of welfare computations in four scenarios. Scenario 
1 is a base case without the Betuweroute. Scenario 2 refers to the introduction of 
marginal social cost (MSC) pricing in the base case. Scenario 3 is the base case with the 
Betuweroute but without MSC pricing. Finally, case 4 refers to the situation in which 
both MSC pricing and the Betuweroute are introduced. The consequences of MSC 
pricing are according to expectation; net user surplus decreases because of lower 
transport demand and higher generalised transport prices, toll revenues increase, and 
                                                 
6
 Although this may influence the results somewhat, it is not likely that figures for Belgium and Germany 
are very different from those for The Netherlands. Especially the values of time and the external costs of 
transport may differ slightly among these countries, but not to an extent that results would change in a 
qualitative sense. 
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external costs drop by a large amount. Comparison of the total welfare in both scenarios 
shows that the net effect of these developments is a substantial increase in total welfare. 
Construction of the Betuweroute induces a shift from road to rail transport (see next 
section), and total transport on the network increases slightly. Although external costs 
per tonne kilometre are lower for rail than for road transport, the net effect of these 
developments is a slight increase in total external costs. Ultimately, in accordance with 
earlier Betuweroute assessments, the construction and operation of the Betuweroute is 
not profitable for the operator and also causes a substantial drop in total welfare. This 
result is reached when the Betuweroute is introduced in the base case, but also when it 
is introduced in a situation with MSC pricing. Not surprisingly, the main reason for this 
result is the large infrastructure investment costs associated with the Betuweroute. 
Table 4: Welfare effects in the four scenarios in millions of Euro per year (figures are discounted sums in 
2000 using a 4% discount rate). 
 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Passenger transport users' surplus (1)     
Total 8,987,390 8,933,051 8,987,463 8,933,145 
Freight transport users' costs (2)     
Local 3,769,810 3,822,600 3,769,311 3,822,033 
Transit 1,245,791 1,261,208 1,244,336 1,259,680 
Net user surplus (3) = (1) – (2)     
Total 3,971,788 3,849,244 3,973,816 3,851,432 
Toll revenues (4)     
Central government – 130.4 – 130.1 
Betuwe  – 53.3 171.9 
Infrastructure costs     
Investment Betuwe (5) – – 3,434 3,434 
Salvage value Betuwe (6) – – 483 483 
Operation and maintenance costs (7) 
    
Operation costs central 23,784 20,063 23,807 20,089 
Operation costs Betuwe – – 294 278 
Profits operator (8) = (4) – (7) – (5) + (6)  
    
Central –23,784 110,382 –23,807 109,999 
Betuwe – – –3,192 –3,057 
External costs (9)     
Total 35,595 30,499 35,601 30,512 
Total welfare (10) = (3) + (8) – (9)     
Total 3,912,408 3,929,128 3,911,216 3,927,862 
 
5.2. Changes in transport flows 
 
Note that there is an autonomous growth in transport flows of 2% per year and that 
flows may furthermore change due to differences in congestion on the various links. 
This implies that total transport in 2025 can be maximally 64% percent higher than that 
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in 2000 (1.0225 = 1.64), but that transport on a specific link may show a larger increase 
because of differences in congestion and associated substitution of flows between 
routes. 
 
Scenario 1 
 
In Table 5 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 1, with 
initial transport flows in 2000 set equal to 1. Compared to 2000 the local and transit 
freight flows on the entire network in 2025 have grown by approximately 53% (not in 
table). Compared to a maximum growth of 64% we may therefore conclude that 
congestion substantially reduces freight transport flows. Furthermore, especially rail 
transport in the Netherlands and Belgium increase substantially, both in a relative and 
an absolute sense. Apparently congestion on roads and water in these countries lead to 
substitution towards rail. 
Table 5: Quantities on the various paths in the network in 2025 for Scenario 1 (input Scenario 1 
in 2000 = 1). 
  
 
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 1.55 1.49 1.45 
IWW – 1.36 1.45 
Rail 1.58 1.76 1.69 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – – – 
Road 1.61 1.56 1.60 
IWW – 1.53 1.57 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 1.63 1.69 1.73 
Road 1.62 1.54 1.55 
IWW – 1.59 1.60 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 1.40 1.54 1.55 
 
When looking more specifically at total freight flows to and from the three ports (see 
Table 6), we see a striking reduction in the competitive position of Rotterdam. This is 
especially true for transit freight, which partly switches to the ports of Antwerp and 
Hamburg. Apparently, congestion on the links from Rotterdam to the Ruhr area, and 
vice versa, become problematic in the future. 
Table 6: Total quantities from or to Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg in 2025 for Scenario 1 (input 
Scenario 1 in 2000 = 1). 
 Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Rotterdam 1.56 1.48 1.49 
Antwerp 1.61 1.57 1.60 
Hamburg 1.52 1.54 1.55 
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Scenario 2 
 
In Table 7 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 2 
compared to the output in 2025 for Scenario 1. Compared to 2000 the freight flows on 
the entire network in 2025 have increased by approximately 24% (not in table). When 
we compare this figure to the growth figures in scenario 1, marginal social cost pricing 
apparently causes a large reduction in transport flows. There furthermore is a striking 
shift from road and rail to waterway transport, likely because of the relatively limited 
maintenance costs for waterways. Furthermore, although total freight flows have 
decreased, the competitive positions of the three ports are similar to those in scenario 1 
(not in Table). This is not entirely surprising since we have made almost no distinction 
in external costs between The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Only external costs 
of congestion are different between the three regions, but they apparently do not make a 
substantial contribution to total external costs per kilometer. 
Table 7: Transport flows going to and from the three ports in 2025 for Scenario 2 (output Scenario 1 in 
2025 = 1). 
 
 
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 0.88 0.78 0.75 
IWW – 0.82 0.87 
Rail 0.89 0.84 0.80 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – – – 
Road 0.93 0.82 0.83 
IWW - 0.96 0.97 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 0.94 0.81 0.82 
Road 0.93 0.80 0.78 
IWW – 1.03 1.00 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 0.78 0.78 0.76 
 
Scenario 3 
 
In Table 8 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 3. For 
Scenario 3 the freight flows in 2025 have increased by approximately 55% compared to 
2000 (not in table). Compared to an total increase of 52% in scenario 1 the additional 
freight link therefore has a slight positive effect on total freight transport. This is also 
expressed in the increase in transport flows along the Betuweroute (which is below the 
increase on other links because the reference year is 2008 instead of 2000). 
The consequences of the Betuweroute for the port of Rotterdam in 2025 are large (see 
Table 9). The competitive position of Rotterdam now improves vis-à-vis Antwerp and 
Hamburg. However, this change in competitive position is a direct consequence of two 
central assumptions, i.e., our assumption that freight flows on the Betuweroute in 2008 
resemble the transport flow estimates made by the Betuweroute operator, and our 
assumption that the distribution of freight to local and transit freight on the Betuweroute 
is identical to the distribution of freight flows on the existing rail link in 2000. In this 
view, the change in competitive position is there by construction, and may not be seen 
as pure output of the model. 
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Table 8: Quantities on the various paths in the network in 2025 for Scenario 3 (input Scenario 1 
in 2000 = 1*). 
  
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 1.55 1.48 1.30 
IWW – 1.36 1.12 
Rail 1.57 1.73 1.21 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – 1.49 1.45 
Road 1.61 1.56 1.56 
IWW – 1.53 1.53 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 1.63 1.69 1.68 
Road 1.62 1.54 1.51 
IWW – 1.59 1.56 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 1.40 1.54 1.51 
Note: * For the Betuweroute the quantities in 2008 are set at 1. 
 
For local freight the figures for Antwerp and Hamburg are identical to those in 
scenario 1, which makes sense since nothing has changed there locally. For Rotterdam, 
local freight has increased slightly vis-à-vis scenario 1 because of the Betuweroute. 
Transit freight has also increased for Rotterdam, which is for a large part due to a shift 
back from Antwerp and Hamburg. This shift cannot be observed from the tables 
directly. However, observe that if transit freight has increased on the entire network, 
then the decrease in Antwerp and Hamburg must have been more than offset by an 
increase in Rotterdam. 
Table 9: Total quantities from or to Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg in 2025 for Scenario 3 (input 
Scenario 1 in 2000 = 1). 
 Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Rotterdam 1.56 1.50 1.63 
Antwerp 1.62 1.57 1.56 
Hamburg 1.52 1.54 1.51 
 
Scenario 4 
 
In Table 10 we present indexed transport flows in the year 2025 for scenario 4. 
Compared to 2000 freight flows on the entire network in 2025 have grown by 
approximately 27% (not in table). The freight figures are lower than under current 
pricing (scenario 1 and 3) but higher than in the scenario with marginal social cost 
pricing and without the Betuweroute (scenario 2). Again we see a substitution of freight 
transport from road and rail to water. Note that the figures (except those for the 
Betuweroute) are almost identical to those under scenario 2. This implies that marginal 
social cost pricing in the situation with the Betuweroute has no additional effect on the 
competitive position of Rotterdam versus Antwerp and Hamburg. 
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Table 10: Quantities on the various paths in the network in 2025 for Scenario 4 (input Scenario 1 
in 2000 = 1*). 
  
Passenger Local freight Transit freight 
Road 0.88 0.78 0.75 
IWW – 0.82 0.88 
Rail 0.89 0.83 0.79 
Rotterdam-Ruhr 
Betuwe – 0.91 0.87 
Road 0.93 0.82 0.83 
IWW – 0.96 0.97 Antwerp-Ruhr 
Rail 0.94 0.81 0.82 
Road 0.93 0.80 0.78 
IWW – 1.03 1.00 Hamburg-Ruhr 
Rail 0.78 0.78 0.76 
Note: * For the Betuweroute the quantities in 2008 are set at 1. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
 
The construction of the Betuweroute has been a heavily debated issue in The 
Netherlands. Even at the moment strong doubts exist with respect to its profitability and 
its potential to attract transport from other transport routes. In this paper we use a 
transport model to analyse some of the potential consequences of construction and 
operation of the Betuweroute. The network includes transport from Rotterdam, Antwerp 
and Hamburg to the Ruhr area, and vice versa. Net growth of demand for transport on 
each link is assumed to be equal to 2% per year, which ensures that congestion in the 
network increases substantially over time. We run the model from 2000 to 2025 and 
analyse transport flows and welfare effects using a specific transport network under four 
scenarios, i.e., with and without the Betuweroute, and under current pricing and 
marginal social cost pricing. Our main findings are as follows. 
Under current prices and without the Betuweroute, freight flows on the entire network 
increase with approximately 53% in 2025 vis-à-vis 2000. Without congestion, flows 
would increase by 64%, which shows that congestion substantially reduces transport 
flows. We also see a striking reduction in the competitive position of the port of 
Rotterdam. This is especially true for transit freight, which partly switches to the ports 
of Antwerp and Hamburg. Especially the congestion on the links from Rotterdam to the 
Ruhr area appear to become problematic in the future. When marginal social cost 
pricing is introduced, thereby increasing the price of transport, freight transport on the 
entire network in 2025 is reduced even further, and the competitive position of 
Rotterdam does not improve. In the scenarios with the Betuweroute, freight on the 
entire network increases vis-à-vis the scenarios without the Betuweroute. This increase 
in generic freight transport is also expressed in substantial transport flows on the 
Betuweroute itself. Also striking are the consequences of the Betuweroute for the port 
of Rotterdam in 2025, the competitive position of which has now increased vis-à-vis 
Antwerp and Hamburg in 2025. 
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The welfare consequences of introducing marginal social costs pricing are according 
to expectation; net user surplus decreases because transport demand decreases and 
generalised transport prices increase, toll revenues increase, and external costs drop 
substantially. The result is a substantial increase in total welfare. However, the welfare 
consequences of the Betuweroute are negative. Although unit toll is higher than unit 
variable costs of operation and maintenance, toll revenues are not nearly enough to 
cover total costs of operation and maintenance. Together with the substantial investment 
costs this leads to a negative profit and a substantial drop in social welfare. This 
analysis therefore shows that, although the Betuweroute may certainly be beneficial to 
the competitive position of the port of Rotterdam, investment costs of the Betuweroute 
are too large for the investment to be sensible from a welfare perspective. Admittedly 
this result is partly based on earlier assumptions regarding future transport on the 
Betuweroute, but since these assumptions are likely biased upwards, the results should 
not be expected to become more favourable for the Betuweroute if more accurate actual 
transport flows would be used. It is therefore clear that ex ante assessments of the 
Betuweroute, if a sensible transport model and network had been used, could already 
have shown the economic consequences of the Betuwe investment. Whatever the actual 
outcome of the investment decision in the political arena would have been, had such an 
analysis been available at that stage, at least it would have been based on more objective 
and rational information. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This research was funded by the EC programme FUNDING, financed by the Sixth 
Framework Programme Priority. The MOLINO model used in this study was developed 
by Saskia van der Loo, José Moyano and Stef Proost at the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, and André de Palma at the Université de Cergy-Pontoise. We are indebted to 
Barry Ubbels for early contributions to the paper. We also are indebted to two 
anonymous referees for valuable comments on an earlier version. 
 
 
References 
 
Algemene Rekenkamer (2000) Beleidsinformatie Betuweroute (Policy Information Betuweroute, in 
Dutch), Den Haag. 
CPB (1993) "De Macro-Economische Effecten van de Betuweroute" ("The Macroeconomic Effects of the 
Betuweroute", in Dutch), Werkdocument 52, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
CPB (1995) "Economische Effecten van de Betuweroute op Basis van Recente Informatie" ("Economic 
Effects of the Betuweroute Based on Recent Information", in Dutch), Werkdocument 75, The Hague, 
The Netherlands. 
De Palma, A., Proost, S. and Van der Loo, S. (2010) "Assessing Transport Investments - Towards a 
Multi-Purpose Tool", Transportation Research B, available online 13 January 2010, 
doi:10.1016/j.trb.2009.12.006. 
European Commission (2005) Trans-European Transport Network: TEN-T Priority Axis and Projects 
2005, Brussels. 
Farrell, S. (1999) Financing European Transport Infrastructure, MacMillan, London. 
Haralambides, H.E. (2002) "Competition, Excess Capacity, and the Pricing of Port Infrastructure", 
International Journal of Maritime Economics 4: 323–347. 
Knight Wendling (1991) Evaluatie van de Betuwe Goederenspoorlijn: Kernpunten (Evaluation of the 
Betuwe Freight Railway: Core Issues, in Dutch), Amsterdam. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 44 (2010): 57-75 
 75 
Knight Wendling (1992) Macro Economische en Maatschappelijke Kosten-Baten Analyse van de Betuwe 
Route (Macro Economic and Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Betuwe Route, in Dutch), Amsterdam. 
Koetse, M.J. and Rouwendal, J. (2008) "Transport and Welfare Consequences of Infrastructure 
Investment: A Case Study for the Betuweroute", Task report Deliverable 5, Funding Infrastructure: 
Guidelines for Europe - FUNDING, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
Meersman H., Voorde E. and Vanelslander T. (2002), "Port Pricing Issues", paper presented at the second 
seminar of the IMPRINT-Europe Thematic Network, Antwerp. 
NEA, STERC, TRANSCARE (2005) Vergelijkingskader Modaliteiten, Versie 1.4 (Comparison 
Framework for Freight Modes, Version 1.4, in Dutch), NEA Transport Research and Training, 
Rijswijk, The Netherlands. 
Nellthorp J., Sansom T., Bickel P., Doll C. and Lindberg G. (2001), "Valuation Conventions for UNITE", 
UNITE Deliverable 2, Funded by 5th Framework RTD Programme, ITS, University of Leeds, Leeds. 
NS, Prorail (2006) Netwerkanalyse Spoor (Network Analysis Rail Infrastructure, in Dutch), NS/Prorail, 
Den Haag. 
Smith, W.S., Hall, F.L., Montgomery, F.O. (1996), "Comparing the Speed-Flow Relationship for 
Motorways with New Data from the M6", Transportation Research A 30: 89–101. 
TCI, (2004) Onderzoek naar Infrastructuurprojecten: Reconstructie Betuweroute (Research on 
Infrastructure Projects: Reconstruction Betuweroute, in Dutch), Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
Den Haag. 
Van Wee, G.P., Thomas, R., Dunnewold, W., and van den Heuvel, M. (1994) "Effecten van de 
Betuweroute op NOx en CO2 Emissie's ("Impact of the Betuwe-line on NOx and CO2 Emissions", in 
Dutch), RIVM Rapport 251701015, National Institute for Public health and the Environment (RIVM), 
Bilthoven, The Netherlands. 
 
